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ATLANTIC CITY SPECIAL: WHETHER THE CASINO
EXCEPTION TO THE NEW JERSEY SMOKE-FREE AIR ACT
COMPORTS WITH THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION’S
GENERAL PROHIBITION OF SPECIAL LAWS
Randy Samson ∗
April 14, 2006—Kelly’s Tavern in New Brunswick, New Jersey.
11:50 P.M. Almost in unison, the patrons of the small corner bar light
up cigarettes. The manager has announced that, come midnight, the
ashtrays will be removed and smoking inside the establishment will be
prohibited in compliance with New Jersey’s new indoor smoking ban.
Grumbles of contempt provide the soundtrack as the smoke grows so
thick that patrons struggle to see the televisions across the bar. Ten
minutes later, the clouds of silver begin to thin, as the tavern’s em1
ployees make good on the manager’s word and remove the ashtrays.
On April 15, at 12:00 A.M., Kelly’s Tavern, like hundreds of other bars
2
and indoor areas across the state of New Jersey, went smoke-free.
September 8, 2006—The Tropicana Casino and Resort in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Midnight. A cascading array of colors, lights,
and sounds, the classic overwhelming casino environment, provides
the backdrop as throngs of excited gamblers try their luck at the
countless games of chance on the casino floor. Just as shrieks of joy
and moans of defeat fill the air, so too does a steady flow of cigarette
and cigar smoke, creeping between the slot machines, hanging before the surveillance cameras, engulfing patrons and employees, locals and tourists alike. Nearly five months after the implementation
of the New Jersey indoor smoking ban, tobacco smoke continues to
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1
This information is from the author’s personal experience.
2
Allison Pries & Eric Hsu, Smokers Cope with Ban; Others Relish Fresh Air, THE
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Apr. 16, 2006, at A1 (stating that hundreds of bars
across New Jersey observed the smokers’ “last call” at midnight).
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stand alongside gambling chips, free drinks, and artificial daylight as
3
a mainstay of the Atlantic City casino experience.
INTRODUCTION
As of October 1, 2007, twenty-three states did not allow smoking
4
in restaurants, and seventeen states had similar bans for all bars.
The trend of enacting such bans is a relatively recent one, as the old5
est took effect only fourteen years ago, and over one-third of the
6
bans took effect in the past two years.
These statewide indoor smoking bans, while typically broad in
their definition of establishments covered by the ban, generally pro7
vide for some narrow exceptions. For instance, New York forbids
smoking in all “places of employment[,] bars [, and] food service
8
establishments.” However, this broad language is later narrowed in
the statute by exceptions to the smoking ban for, among other establishments, “[r]etail tobacco businesses[,] [m]embership organiza9
tions . . . [and] [c]igar bars.” Likewise, the Colorado Clean Air Act’s
prohibition of smoking “in any indoor area” excludes casino floors
10
and cigar bars from the statute’s otherwise broad purview.
As would be expected, the number of legal challenges to these
statewide bans and their exceptions has grown, particularly in the
form of federal constitutional challenges, as the bans have taken ef-

3

This information is from the author’s personal experience.
AM. NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUND., STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES WITH 100%
SMOKEFREE LAWS IN WORKPLACES, RESTAURANTS, AND BARS 3, 4 (2006), http:// www.nosmoke.org/pdf/100ordlist.pdf. These numbers do not include those states that
merely require separate areas for smokers in such establishments, nor do they include bans that allow for exceptions based on the size of the establishment. Id.
5
Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline: The Twentieth Century 1950–1999—The Battle Is Joined, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/Tobacco_History20-2.html
(last visited Oct. 2, 2007); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1742 (2006).
6
Borio, supra note 5; AM. NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUND., supra note 4.
7
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-14-204 (2006) (prohibiting smoking “in any indoor area,” with statutory exceptions); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 270, § 22 (LexisNexis
2006) (listing more than twenty classes of indoor areas in which smoking is prohibited, including bars and restaurants); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-58 (West 2006) (stating
that “[s]moking is prohibited in an indoor public place or workplace,” unless otherwise provided for in the statute).
8
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o (Consol. 2006).
9
Id. § 1399-q.
10
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-14-204, -205; see also, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
1542 (2005) (excluding, among other establishments, bingo halls and off-track betting facilities from otherwise broad indoor smoking prohibition); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2320.10-6 (2005) (excluding, among other establishments, retail tobacco stores, and
smoking bars from otherwise broad indoor smoking prohibition).
4
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11

fect across the country. In New York, a lobbying group formed to
promote the interests of smokers assailed the previously described
smoking ban on a host of constitutional grounds, including substantive Due Process, procedural Due Process, Equal Protection, the
12
Right to Travel, Freedom of Speech, and Freedom of Assembly.
Similarly, owners and operators of restaurants authorized to sell alcoholic beverages in Connecticut mounted a more narrow challenge to
that state’s indoor smoking ban and, more specifically, the statute’s
exception of casinos on Native American tribal lands and private
clubs, alleging that the exception constituted a violation of federal
13
equal protection. However, while the number of these challenges
14
has mounted, all have proven unsuccessful.
On January 15, 2006, New Jersey joined the ranks of states enacting general prohibitions of smoking in indoor areas, including bars
15
and restaurants, by passing the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act. As
have all other states with such bans, New Jersey scaled back the initially broad language of its general prohibition by classifying certain
16
indoor areas as outside the scope of the statute. Among the classes
17
of indoor areas exempted from the statute are casinos.
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the New Jersey indoor smoking ban from a New Jersey constitutional standpoint. In
particular, the Comment focuses on the exclusion of casinos from the
statute’s purview, and whether such an exclusion comports with the
New Jersey Constitution’s general prohibition of special, private, or
18
local laws. Part I gives a brief history of smoking bans in the United
States, concluding with a more detailed look at the New Jersey
19
Smoke-Free Air Act. In Part II, the Comment examines the federal
Constitutional challenges to state smoking bans and how those chal20
lenges have faired. Part III lays out the New Jersey special law analy21
sis that has evolved since the state prohibited such laws. Finally, Part
11

See infra notes 89–145 and accompanying text.
New York City C.L.A.S.H. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
13
Batte-Holmgren v. Galvin, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3313 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Nov. 5, 2004), aff’d Batte-Holmgren v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 914 A.2d 996 (Conn.
2007).
14
See infra notes 89–145 and accompanying text.
15
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-55 to -64 (West 2006).
16
Id. § 26:3D-59.
17
Id. § 26:3D-59(e).
18
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 7.
19
See infra notes 24–89 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 90–145 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 146–237 and accompanying text.
12
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IV conducts a special law analysis of the New Jersey indoor smoking
22
ban. The Comment concludes that New Jersey’s special law jurisprudence is unclear on a subtle yet vital element of the special law
analysis, and that the resolution of this grey area will likely determine
whether the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act’s exclusion of casinos
23
renders the statute an unconstitutional special law.
I.

HISTORY OF AMERICAN SMOKING BANS AND THE
NEW JERSEY SMOKE-FREE AIR ACT

A. A Brief History of the Anti-Smoking Movement and State Smoking
Bans in the United States
Tobacco use can be described as an American practice in virtually every sense. The world’s first tobacco plant is believed to have
24
grown in the Americas in approximately 6000 B.C. Thousands of
years later, Christopher Columbus’s epic voyage revealed not only the
presence of the Americas to the Old World, but also the presence of
certain dried leaves that the natives showed an affinity for chewing or
25
“drinking their smoke” through a pipe. In 1619, when the first representative legislative assembly in the American colonies met in
Jamestown, Virginia, the first law passed regulated the sale of to26
bacco.
For nearly as long as tobacco has been used (at least by Europeans and American colonists), it has evoked disfavor and opposition.
In 1604, King James I, an avid opponent of tobacco use, raised the
27
The Vatican
duty on imported tobacco in England by 4000%.
passed an indoor smoking ban of sorts by forbidding smoking in Ro28
man Catholic basilicas. Even in the American colonies, the birthplace of tobacco, smoking met opposition, as the colony of Massachu29
setts banned public smoking in 1632.
22

See infra notes 238–85 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 241–85 and accompanying text.
24
Gene Borio, The Tobacco Timeline, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/his
tory/Tobacco_History.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
25
RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 9 (1996).
26
Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline: The Seventeenth Century—The Great Age of
the Pipe, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/Tobacco_History17.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2007).
27
KLUGER, supra note 25, at 10.
28
Id. These anti-tobacco measures were considerably less drastic than those employed by Czar Alexis of Russia, apparently a staunch opponent of smoking, who exiled smokers to Siberia. Id.
29
Borio, supra note 26.
23
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Medical research on the effects of tobacco use is also long on
history, if not agreement. The first medical report of the negative effects of tobacco use came from Samuel Pepys in 1665 after he observed a Royal Society experiment in which a cat died when fed a
30
“drop of distilled oil of tobacco.” From that point until the twentieth century, conflicting accounts of tobacco’s effects emerged, rang31
ing from those touting tobacco’s medical uses to those depicting the
32
plant’s use as a serious health risk.
In the 1940s, evidence that tobacco use leads to a variety of dis33
eases came into clearer focus. Influential studies conducted by Drs.
Ernst Wynder and Evarts Graham revealed smokers to be at a greater
risk of developing lung cancer and, later, that mice given tobacco tar
34
The
stood a greater chance of developing malignant tumors.
mounting evidence of the negative effects of smoking culminated in
the 1964 Surgeon General’s report on smoking and health, which
35
concluded that smoking causes lung cancer. These studies and reports received a wide public audience, as their results were published
36
in such mass platforms as The New York Times and Life magazine.
However, while the increased evidence and awareness of the
causal link between cigarette use and cancer were undoubtedly major
factors in the growth of the anti-smoking movement, the medical research most germane to the present-day anti-smoking legislation is
37
that considering the effects of secondhand smoke.
The Surgeon
General, with little supporting scientific evidence at the time, first re38
ported the likely harmful effects of secondhand smoke in 1972.
Since then, while scientists have debated whether and to what extent
secondhand smoke actually produces such harm, the public has
grown less tolerant of smoking in public and the workplace, leading
39
to restrictions by the government and private business.
Even before the advancements in medical research, states had
taken various measures to curb tobacco smoking, with varying levels
30

STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 1 (1996).
Borio, supra note 26. In the same year that Pepys was conducting his experiment, smoking was made mandatory at Eton to ward off infection and combat the
bubonic plague. Id.
32
See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 30, at 1.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 25.
35
Id. at 1.
36
Id. at 25.
37
See id. at 391.
38
KLUGER, supra note 25, at 366.
39
GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 30, at 391.
31
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of success. As previously mentioned, Massachusetts had banned pub40
lic smoking for a time during its colonial period. The first organized anti-tobacco movement began as an adjunct to the temperance
41
movement in the 1830s. While cigarette use enjoyed a watershed
period in the late nineteenth century due to the introduction of
42
techniques for mass cigarette production, opposition to cigarette
43
smoking grew beyond that of other uses of tobacco, leading to successful statewide restrictions. Between 1893 and 1909, fifteen states
passed legislation that survived judicial scrutiny banning the sale of
44
However, this upsurge of anti-smoking sentiment was
cigarettes.
45
short-lived, as a combination of the beginning of World War I, the
46
growth of smoking among women, and the disastrous attempt at the
47
prohibition of alcohol rendered anti-smoking legislation unpopular.
In 1927, when Kansas dropped its ban on the sale of cigarettes, it was
48
the last state in the period to do so.
Evidence of the harmful effects of secondhand smoke breathed
49
new life into the anti-smoking movement in the 1970s. The year
1973 saw the passage of the first serious statewide anti-smoking legislation following the mid-century medical advancements, with Arizona
banning smoking in libraries, theaters, museums, concert halls, and
50
buses. Two years later, Minnesota passed its much broader Clean
51
Indoor Air Act, prohibiting smoking in nearly all confined public
places, including restaurants and workplaces, unless separate smok52
ing areas were provided. However, the shift toward greater regula40

Borio, supra note 26.
Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline: The Nineteenth Century—The Age of the Cigar, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/Tobacco_History19.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
42
KLUGER, supra note 25, at 19.
43
Id. at 37–40.
44
Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline: The Twentieth Century 1900–1949—The Rise
of the Cigarette, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/Tobacco_History20-1
.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
45
KLUGER, supra note 25, at 63–64. Cigarettes were the only form of tobacco that
lent itself to use in war, as other forms were viewed as unmanageable, unsanitary, or
generally bothersome. Id. The cigarette companies, aware of this reality, took great
effort to seize upon the patriotic spirit of the day, heavily advertising their contributions of cigarettes to the soldiers in battle. Id.
46
Id. at 65–66.
47
Id. at 68.
48
Id. at 69.
49
Pun intended.
50
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-601.01 (LexisNexis 2006).
51
MINN. STAT. § 144.411 to 144.417 (2005).
52
KLUGER, supra note 25, at 374.
41
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tion of smoking was slow; the anti-smoking statutes passed in Mon53
54
tana and Nebraska shortly after Minnesota’s measure were far less
comprehensive, and restrictive measures similar to that in Minnesota
55
were vetoed by the governors of Illinois and Maine.
Still, by 1986, thirty-five states had restricted smoking on public
transit, thirty-one in elevators, twenty-nine in cultural and recreational facilities, twenty-seven in schools, and nineteen in libraries;
twenty-two required segregated areas in public office buildings, and
56
nine required such in private ones. As a greater degree of agreement grew on the harmful effects of secondhand smoke, the antismoking movement took on a strategy of undercutting “the social
support network for smoking by implicitly defining it as an antisocial
57
act.”
In 1990, San Luis Obispo, California, became the first city in the
United States to ban smoking in all public buildings including bars
58
and restaurants. Vermont passed a broad ban on indoor smoking in
59
1993, becoming the first state in the modern era of smoking regula60
In the thirteen years since, fourteen states have
tion to do so.
joined Vermont, at least to the extent of passing broad smoking bans
that include restaurants and do not allow for separate smoking areas,
61
62
and eleven states have extended such bans to bars.
B. The New Jersey Indoor Smoking Ban
New Jersey passed the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act on January
63
15, 2006, with the statute taking effect on April 15 of the same year.
The statute declared the following findings as motivation for the
measure:
[T]obacco is the leading cause of preventable disease and death
in the State and the nation, and tobacco smoke constitutes a substantial health hazard to the nonsmoking majority of the public;
the separation of smoking and nonsmoking areas in indoor pub53

MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-40-101 to -120 (2005).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5701 to -5713 (2006).
55
KLUGER, supra note 25, at 375.
56
Id. at 557.
57
Id. at 553.
58
Borio, supra note 5.
59
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1742–1746 (2006).
60
Borio, supra note 5. Bars were originally exempt from Vermont’s ban. Id.
61
These eleven states include Vermont. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1742–1746
(2006).
62
AM. NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUND., supra note 4.
63
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-55 to -64 (West 2006).
54
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lic places and workplaces does not eliminate the hazard to nonsmokers if these areas share a common ventilation system; and,
therefore, subject to certain specified exceptions, it is clearly in
the public interest to prohibit smoking in all enclosed indoor
64
places of public access and workplaces.

Thus, the primary purpose of the statute, to prevent tobacco-related
disease, particularly to the “nonsmoking majority of the public,” is
65
readily apparent. No legislative purpose or justification is stated for
66
the exceptions to the ban beyond the implication that the public in67
terest is not served by banning smoking in the exempt areas.
The statute states that “[s]moking is prohibited in any indoor
68
public place or workplace, except as otherwise provided in this act.”
Included in the exceptions provided for by the act is “the area within
the perimeter of . . . any casino . . . that contains at least 150 standalone slot machines, 10 table games, or some combination thereof
approved by the commission, which machines and games are avail69
able to the public for wagering.” The casino exception applies only
to gambling floors, not to other public areas that might be thought to
be within the confines of the casino, such as enclosed bars and res70
taurants. Because the New Jersey Constitution permits casinos only
71
within Atlantic City, the casino exception to the New Jersey indoor
smoking statute effectively applies to only one narrow class of establishments in one geographic area.
The reaction to the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act at this relatively early point in the legislation’s lifetime has by and large reflected the interests of those affected. Non-smokers generally supported the bill’s passage and have largely sung its praises since

64

§ 26:3D-56.
Id.
66
§ 26:3D-55 to -64.
67
§ 26:3D-56.
68
§ 26:3D-58.
69
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-59. Other areas excluded from the statute include
cigar bars and tobacco retail establishments. Id. Whether these exceptions render
the statute a special law is beyond the scope of this Comment, although one potentially but not necessarily relevant difference between these establishments and
casinos is that these establishments are not confined to a single municipality in New
Jersey.
70
Id.; see also Lisa Grzyboski, Smoking Ban Challenge Fails, COURIER-POST (Cherry
Hill, N.J.), Apr. 14, 2006, at 1G (listing the covered and exempt classes of establishments).
71
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2.
65
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72

enactment. Smokers predictably, although not uniformly, have ex73
Bar and restaurant owners
pressed dissatisfaction with the ban.
have taken varying stances on the legislation, with some welcoming
the opportunity to offer a smoke-free environment without worrying
74
about the loss of patrons to establishments that allow smoking, while
75
others braced for an overall decline in business, particularly because
76
the casinos remained an option for smokers. At this early point, little conclusive evidence exists on the effect, if any, the ban has had on
the business of New Jersey restaurants and bars, although the trend in
other states implementing smoking bans has been that the more a
business relies on liquor sales, the more negative an effect the ban
77
has had.
One aspect of the New Jersey indoor smoking ban that has gar78
nered virtually unanimous enmity is the exception for casinos. Proponents of the indoor smoking ban have criticized the exception as
contrary to the spirit of the ban, which is meant to protect employees
and the non-smoking majority from the ailments caused by second-

72

See, e.g., Pries & Hsu, supra note 2, at A1 (quoting a non-smoker characterizing
the new law as an attempt to get smokers to respect the lives of those around them).
But see id. (quoting non-smoker characterizing ban as “un-American”).
73
See, e.g., Grzyboski, supra note 70, at 1G (smokers describing ban as “awful” and
“unfair”); John Holl, Customers May Follow Smoke out the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006,
§ 14NJ, at 6 (North Jersey smoker telling how he stopped going to New York after its
smoking ban was enacted, and how he would now have to leave New Jersey); Pries &
Hsu, supra note 2, at A1 (pack-a-day smoker describing the new law as an annoying
imposition). But see Richard Pearsall, New Restrictions Cause Only a Few Ripples for Businesses, COURIER-POST (Cherry Hill, N.J.), Apr. 22, 2006, at 1G (smoker saying that
when she wants a cigarette, she simply goes outside and has one); Pries & Hsu, supra
note 2, at A1 (smoker explaining that the new ban will help him to smoke less).
74
See, e.g., Holl, supra note 73, at 6 (diner manager expressing gratitude for the
ban, as she desired to have her diner smoke-free for years but feared losing smokers
as customers); Pries & Hsu, supra note 2, at A1 (bar and grill owner excited that
more young families will now frequent the establishment).
75
See, e.g., Grzyboski, supra note 70, at 1G (restaurant manager expressing worry
that customers of smaller New Jersey pubs will forego those establishments for bars in
Philadelphia, where no such smoking ban exists); Tim O’Reiley, Bars Split on Smoking
Ban: Will It Snuff Out Profits?, DAILY RECORD (Morristown, N.J.), Apr. 13, 2006 (President of New Jersey Restaurant Association stating that certain establishments could
face an initial decline in business of fifteen to forty percent, and bartender describing her clientele as ninety percent smokers and stating that the bar’s management
and employees are “freaked out about” the smoking ban and its effect on business).
76
See, e.g., Holl, supra note 73, at 6 (quoting an Atlantic City pub owner stating
that “[t]his ban is going to annihilate [my business],” largely because casinos remain
an option for smokers who wish to drink and smoke inside).
77
O’Reiley, supra note 75.
78
See Pearsall, supra note 73, at 1G (“The casino exception has become a lightning rod for the anger of smokers and nonsmokers alike . . . .”).
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79

hand smoke.
Opponents of the ban complain that the separate
treatment casinos receive under the ban creates an unfair, unequal
80
playing field in the competition for smoking patrons. Both sides
criticize the exception as “blatant favoritism for a powerful indus81
try.”
Statements from the New Jersey legislators that passed the ban
have done little to quell such criticism. As one New York Times article
stated, “lawmakers who supported the ban say the casino exemption
was essential to overcome opposition from the powerful casino indus82
try and its allies in the Legislature’s South Jersey delegation.” State
Senator Joe Vitale, chairman of the Senate’s health committee, stated
that “[i]n a perfect world, the casino floors would be included, but
83
[the state Senate and Assembly] just don’t have the votes.” Likewise, Assemblyman Richard Merkt criticized the exception, characterizing it as a concession to “big business” while “small business” re84
ceived “the back of the hand.”
79

See, e.g., Editorial, Going Smokeless, but Not Far Enough, Ban Should One Day Include Casinos, HERALD NEWS (Passaic County, N.J.), Apr. 14, 2006, at B11 (saying that
the ban should be extended to include casinos as a matter of universal health).
80
See, e.g., Grzyboski, supra note 70, at 1G (smoker characterizing the ban as particularly unfair considering the exemption of casinos); Holl, supra note 73, at 6 (Atlantic City pub owner explaining that the closer a bar is to a casino, the more negative the effect on that bar’s business the ban will be).
81
Pearsall, supra note 73, at 1G.
82
Holl, supra note 73, at 6; see also Kaitlin Gurney, N.J. Ban on Indoor Smoking
Passes, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 10, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Gurney, N.J. Ban]
(describing lawmakers who regretted the casino exemption as conceding that the bill
would not have passed without the exemption); Elisa Ung, Smoking Ban Advances to a
Final Vote, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 6, 2006, at B01 (describing an assemblywoman who sponsored the bill as regretting that the exemption of casinos was necessary).
83
Kaitlin Gurney, Odds Against Atlantic City, N.J., Casino Smoking Ban,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 4, 2005, at B01 [hereinafter Gurney, Odds Against A.C.].
84
Gurney, N.J. Ban, supra note 82, at A1. The New Jersey Legislature did not release any hearing transcripts, debate transcripts, or witness testimony on the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act, making a more thorough determination of the justification
of the casino exemption difficult. See New Jersey Legislature—Bills, http://www.njleg
.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (select “2004–2005” for “Legislative Session” under
“Bill Search”; then search for “S1926”; then follow “S1926” hyperlink) (last visited
Oct. 2, 2007) (containing links to the documents on file with the New Jersey State
Library that comprise the legislative history of the Smoke-Free Air Act). The legislative history for the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act on file with the New Jersey State
Library contains only the following: the bill as first introduced in the Senate, along
with the sponsor’s statement; a subsequent reprint of the bill before the Senate; the
Senate Health, Human Services, and Senior Citizens Committee statement on the
bill to the Senate; the statement of the bill to the Senate with Senate floor amendments; a subsequent reprint of the bill before the Senate; the Assembly Health and
Human Services Committee statement on the bill to the Senate; the legislative fiscal
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The New Jersey Casino Association, which lobbied vigorously
against a smoking ban in casinos, commissioned a study that found
that a Delaware smoking ban had a negative economic effect on the
85
majority of racetracks equipped with slot machines in that state.
86
From this finding, which critics of the study dubbed “misleading,”
the study concluded that a smoking ban in New Jersey casinos would
87
drive gamblers to other states and cost casino employees their jobs.
State Senator John Adler, who sponsored the legislation that would
become the New Jersey ban, noted this study in observing that “[t]he
state is allowed to draw rational distinctions about what it regulates
88
and why it regulates it.” This line of reasoning—that the casino exemption constitutes a legitimate effort to protect the economic interest and vitality of the casinos—has been found by at least one federal
district court outside of New Jersey to be sufficient to justify a casino
89
exemption to a smoking ban similar to that in New Jersey.
II. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE SMOKING BANS
This Comment focuses on whether the New Jersey Smoke-Free
Air Act’s exception of casinos comports with the New Jersey Constitution. However, it is appropriate to examine briefly several federal
constitutional challenges that have arisen against similar smoking
bans and the exceptions therein for two reasons. First, at the risk of
stating the obvious, any federal constitutional objection to another
state’s smoking ban, assuming sufficient similarity between that ban
and New Jersey’s ban, will be equally applicable in New Jersey. Second, and more germane to the focus of this Comment, New Jersey’s
90
special law analysis at least resembles, and in some instances mir-

estimate; the bill as first introduced in the Assembly, along with the sponsor’s statement; a subsequent reprint of the bill before the Assembly; and the Assembly Health
and Human Services Committee statement on the bill to the Assembly. Id. The substance of these documents is essentially limited to the language of the bill in several
of its incarnations. Id.
85
Gurney, Odds Against A.C., supra note 83, at B01.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Kaitlin Gurney, Group Sues over Casino Exemption, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar.
8, 2006, at B01 [hereinafter Gurney, Group Sues]; see also Gurney, N.J. Ban, supra note
82, at A1 (citing Adler’s mention of the New Jersey Casino Association study).
89
See Coal. for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Owens, No. 06-CV-01145, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42723, at *17 (D. Colo. June 23, 2006).
90
See, e.g., Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36, 45
(N.J. 1981) (stating that “[a]n analysis similar to that used in the equal protection
model has traditionally been applied to determine if legislation is proscribed as special”).
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91

rors, a federal constitutional equal protection analysis, one of the
primary grounds upon which smoking bans and their exceptions
92
have been challenged.
A. Substantive Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person
93
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” In Washing94
ton v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court of the United States explained
that “[t]he Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process,
and the ‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint. . . . The Clause also provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and
95
liberty interests.” Opponents of the smoking ban have argued that
the imposition of a blanket prohibition of smoking in indoor areas
denies smokers such a fundamental right under the Constitution,
96
that being the right to smoke.
Glucksberg, however, also expressed the Court’s traditional reluctance to expand the field of fundamental rights under the umbrella
97
of substantive Due Process. To balance the Constitution’s protection of fundamental rights with this reluctance to so categorize asserted rights, federal courts subject the asserted right to a two-part
98
99
test. The asserted right must be defined precisely and then be de100
termined as “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” to
101
be deemed a fundamental right.

91

See, e.g., Robson v. Rodriquez, 141 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1958) (explaining that “[t]he
test of whether a law constitutes special legislation is essentially the same as that
which determines whether it affords equal protection of the laws”).
92
See infra notes 158–63 and accompanying text.
93
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
94
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
95
Id. at 719 (citation omitted).
96
See, e.g., Thiel v. Nelson, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1028 (D. Wis. 2006) (involving a
plaintiff who asserted a fundamental right to smoke in a mental institution); New
York City C.L.A.S.H. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(describing a lobbying group formed to promote the interests of smokers that attacked smoking ban as a violation of a fundamental right to smoke under substantive
Due Process).
97
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
98
Id. at 720–21.
99
Id. at 721; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277–78 (1990).
100
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
101
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21.
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Under the Glucksberg analysis, the various indoor smoking bans
clearly fail to violate any fundamental right. Defined precisely, the
right asserted is not the right to smoke, but rather the right to smoke
102
in indoor public areas. Such a right does not carry the unequivocal
103
Quite the contrary, opsupport of American tradition and history.
position to tobacco use in its variety of forms, and particularly such
use in public and indoor areas, dates back to American colonial
104
times.
Federal courts have been unanimous in their rejection of substantive due process challenges to indoor smoking restrictions. In
105
New York City C.L.A.S.H. v. City of New York, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York expressly stated that
106
smoking bans do not interfere with any fundamental right.
Likewise, in Thiel v. Nelson, the United States District Court for the District
of Wisconsin also declared that “smoking is not a liberty interest pro107
Such a federal challenge would
tected by the due process clause.”
108
fair no better in New Jersey.

102

None of the statewide indoor smoking bans purports to restrict smoking by individuals in their private residences. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-14-205 (2006)
(expressly excluding private residences from the reach of the smoking ban); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1542 (2005) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-59 (West 2006)
(same).
103
See generally supra notes 29, 40–62 and accompanying text.
104
Id.
105
315 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). As discussed earlier, the substantive due
process challenge to the New York Smoking Ban contained therein was just one of
many challenges to the ban, including those based on Equal Protection, the Right to
Travel, procedural Due Process, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the First
Amendment. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
106
New York City C.L.A.S.H., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 482.
107
422 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030 (D. Wis. 2006); see also Gasper v. La. Stadium & Exposition Dist., 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that there is no fundamental
right to prevent smoking in public places, but also recognizing that there is no fundamental right to smoke in public places).
108
An alternative substantive due process challenge mounted in Colorado, a state
similar to New Jersey in its broad ban of indoor smoking and exemption of casinos,
asserted that the fundamental right violated was the right of establishments to allow
smoking on their premises. Coal. for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Owens, No. 06-CV-01145,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42723, at *23–24 (D. Colo. June 23, 2006). This challenge met
the same fate as prior due process challenges, with the court stating, “[t]he notion
that the right to allow smoking in one’s bar or restaurant is a fundamental right,
equivalent to the other rights the Supreme Court has deemed fundamental . . . is to
say the least, far fetched.” Id. at *24.
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B. Regulatory Taking
The Takings Clause, a part of the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, states that no “private property [shall] be taken for
109
public use, without just compensation.”
In interpreting this language, the Supreme Court has extended the Takings Clause beyond
physical appropriation or occupation of property, holding that “a
state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may
so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a
110
‘taking.’”
Alternatively, or perhaps as an extension of this prior
holding, the Court has declared that “when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses
in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property eco111
While these standards alnomically idle, he has suffered a taking.”
112
low for highly subjective and consequently varying interpretations,
these general formulations of the regulatory takings analysis suffice
for the purpose of a brief evaluation of state indoor smoking prohibitions.
Opponents of smoking regulations argue, in this context, that
the bans deprive bar and restaurant owners of economically beneficial use of their respective properties, or at least that the regulations
frustrate the expectations the owners held upon investing in the
113
property. However, while the ever-evolving nature of takings analysis may render it a fertile field for federal challenges to state smoking
114
bans, it appears that one critical obstacle will hamper such challenges. Research on the effects of the bans on bar and restaurant
revenue has come to no consensus that these prohibitions “frustrate

109

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
111
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
112
See Douglas W. Kmiec, Institute of Bill of Rights Law Symposium Defining Takings:
Private Property and the Future of Government Regulation: Inserting the Last Remaining
Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 995 (1997) (characterizing
takings jurisprudence in general as a “1000-piece puzzle[]” and regulatory takings as
an “ill-fitting piece[] left over from other puzzles long ago forgotten”).
113
See, e.g., D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 393 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 2005) (denying claims by plaintiff group of bar, restaurant, and bowling alley owners that an
ordinance requiring the construction of separate smoking areas denied the plaintiffs
economically viable use of their establishments).
114
See, e.g., Robert P. Hagan, Comment, Restaurants, Bars and Workplaces, Lend Me
Your Air: Smokefree Laws as Private Property Exactions—The Undiscovered Country for Nollan and Dolan?, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 143, 149–50 (2005) (suggesting
that the outcome of a Takings Clause challenge to state smoking bans is largely dependent upon how the argument is framed and, consequently, the standard that the
court applies).
110
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distinct investment-backed expectations,” much less deprive restau116
rants or bars of “all economically beneficial uses,” despite the dire
117
Considering the
contrary predictions of smoking ban opponents.
substantial presumption of validity of regulations passed under state
118
police powers and attacked as regulatory takings, it seems unlikely
that the inconclusive research on the denial by smoking regulations
of economically beneficial uses of property could support a takings
119
challenge.
120
In D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, a group of bar, restaurant, and
bowling alley owners challenged a city ordinance requiring that their
establishments provide separate smoking lounges for their smoking
customers on the ground that the ordinance amounted to a regula121
tory taking under the Federal Constitution. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that even if these
establishments lost customers due to the regulation, this mere drop
in customers would not be sufficient to demonstrate the denial of
economically viable use of land necessary to render a regulation a
122
taking.
While the Toledo regulation differs substantially from the
New Jersey ban and other state bans discussed herein, the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning that more than a mere drop in business is necessary
to demonstrate a regulatory taking, particularly considering the inconclusive evidence on whether there is in fact any such drop caused
by indoor smoking bans, would likely be applicable as a significant
123
124
obstacle in a federal challenge to these state bans.
115

Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 127.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
117
See, e.g., O’Reiley, supra note 75 (stating that “[p]ublished studies come to
widely differing conclusions [regarding the effects of smoking bans on the business
of bars and restaurants], largely reflecting the views of the groups that commissioned
them,” and describing the results of several such studies).
118
See Kmiec, supra note 112, at 995 (describing the presumption of validity as
“virtually insurmountable”).
119
But see Hagan, supra note 114, at 149–50 (suggesting that a takings challenge to
these bans could be successful if framed as an exaction analysis, thus requiring a less
deferential judicial standard). This analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment.
120
393 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005).
121
Id. at 694.
122
Id. at 695.
123
This Comment takes no position on the potential for success of a state regulatory taking challenge to the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act beyond noting that the
Supreme Court of New Jersey has characterized New Jersey constitutional takings jurisprudence as “in general conformity” with federal constitutional principles. Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm., 593 A.2d 251, 257 (N.J. 1991).
124
D.A.B.E., Inc., 393 F.3d at 695. The court also recited language used by the
Supreme Court that would work against a takings challenge to state smoking bans. It
said that “[e]ven if the ordinance ‘prevent[ed] the most profitable use of [appel116
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C. Equal Protection
Another federal constitutional ground upon which state smoking bans have been challenged, and one highly relevant to potential
125
attacks to New Jersey’s ban on state constitutional grounds, stems
from the Fourteenth Amendment, which states in pertinent part that
126
“[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
127
equal protection of the laws.” The Supreme Court attempts to balance this principle with the reality that most legislation classifies individuals for separate treatment by requiring that, when “a law neither
128
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class . . . [, a legislative classification need only] bear[] a rational relation to some
129
legitimate end” to comport with the Equal Protection Clause.
Under this analysis, the legitimate end need not be the actual pur130
pose of the legislation, but rather any conceivable legitimate end.
Classifications deemed suspect and thus subjected to a higher standard of scrutiny are generally limited to those that distinguish based
131
132
on race, alienage, national origin, or gender.
Proponents and opponents of indoor smoking bans argue that
the exceptions that the bans generally provide for, such as the casino
exception in New Jersey, arbitrarily classify and discriminate in favor
of those entities to which the exceptions are granted—that is, that
these classifications are not rationally related to any legitimate pur-

lants’] property,’ that would not be enough to establish a taking,” and that “lost profits ‘unaccompanied by any physical property restriction—provides a slender reed
upon which to rest a takings claim.’” Id. at 696 n.1 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979)).
125
See infra notes 158–63 and accompanying text.
126
“Person” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to include more than individuals and would apply to enterprises challenging state smoking bans. See, e.g., Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886)
(interrupting counsel to halt argument on whether “person,” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, encompasses corporations, and holding that it does).
127
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
128
As already discussed, the state smoking bans involve no fundamental right. See
supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text.
129
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
130
U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
131
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
132
The Supreme Court expressly refused to equate “gender classifications, for all
purposes, to classifications based on race or national origin” as subject to the highest
equal protection scrutiny. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996). Nonetheless, the Court held that “[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government
action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action.” Id.
at 531.
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133

pose.
They contend that while the prohibition may promote a
legitimate end—that of improved public health—the exception for
134
certain indoor public areas in no way promotes such an end. On its
face, this argument seems self-evident; exceptions that allow continued smoking and the production of secondhand smoke in indoor areas could not be rationally related to the goal of promoting public
135
health, as the exceptions do just the opposite.
These equal protection arguments against smoking bans, however, fail to fully appreciate the deferential standard applied to classi136
fications not involving a suspect class.
While the exceptions to the
indoor smoking bans may not promote public health, classifications
analyzed by the courts under a rational relationship test need not be
rationally related to the stated, primary, or actual purpose of the legislation, but rather need only be rationally related to any plausible
137
138
purpose.
Thus, in Coalition for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Owens, the
court found a plausible purpose of the Colorado indoor smoking
ban’s exemption of state casinos to be the economic protection of
those casinos against the less regulated Native American casino com139
petitors. An exemption from the smoking ban, the court held, was
140
rationally related to that end. Likewise, a Connecticut court found
141
the exception of Native American-run casinos from the state’s
indoor smoking ban to be rationally related to concerns over the
state’s ability to enforce such a ban on Native American land, again a
legitimate end, even if not the actual purpose of the legislation as a

133

See, e.g., Coal. for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Owens, No. 06-CV-01145 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42723 (D. Colo. June 23, 2006); Batte-Holmgren v. Galvin, No. CV044000287,
2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3313 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2004); O’Reiley, supra note
75 (characterizing the exception as solely the result of favoritism of a powerful lobbying group).
134
Coal. for Equal Rights, Inc., No. 06-CV-01145, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42723, at
*15.
135
Accord Editorial, supra note 79, at B11 (claiming that by excluding casinos, the
New Jersey smoking ban does not go far enough in the protection of public health).
136
See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (“[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity.”); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“[T]his
Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations.”).
137
U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
138
No. 06-CV-01145, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42723 (D. Colo. June 23, 2006).
139
Id. at *17.
140
Id.
141
The conceivable legitimate purpose argument in this case would not be directly on point in New Jersey because New Jersey casinos are not on sovereign Native
American lands.
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142

whole or the exception.
Because at least one of these conceivable
legitimate ends could similarly justify New Jersey’s exception of casi143
nos from its indoor smoking ban, a federal equal protection challenge to the New Jersey ban would likely fail.
In fact, shortly before the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act took
effect, the New Jersey Hospitality Industry for Fairness Coalition chal144
lenged the statute on equal protection grounds. United States District Judge Chesler, in an unpublished ruling, held that a future lawsuit on such grounds would not succeed, and thus the state should
145
not be enjoined from passing the law.
III. NEW JERSEY SPECIAL LAW ANALYSIS
A. New Jersey Constitutional Treatment of Special Laws
The New Jersey Constitution states that “[n]o general law shall
146
embrace any provision of a private, special or local character.” This
147
general prohibition of private, special, or local laws does not, however, completely preclude the possibility of such laws; the state consti-

142

Batte-Holmgren v. Galvin, No. CV044000287, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3313,
at *13–14 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2004); see also Castaways Backwater Cafe, Inc. v.
Marstiller, No. 2:05-cv-273-FtM-29SPC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60317 (D. Fla. Aug. 25,
2006) (finding that the Florida indoor smoking ban that excepted, among other
areas, stand-alone bars, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the economic
considerations that supported the exception satisfied a rational relationship
analysis).
143
New Jersey’s Constitution has been interpreted as containing an implicit Equal
Protection Clause. Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 828 A.2d 306, 314
(N.J. 2003). Equal protection attacks on legislation under the New Jersey Constitution are not analyzed using the rational relationship test but rather a balancing approach that allows the courts “to examine each claim on a continuum that reflects
the nature of the burdened right and the importance of the governmental restriction.” Id. at 315. While the federal and New Jersey tests weigh the same factors and
often produce the same result, id., the Supreme Court of New Jersey expressly declared that state equal protection principles provide New Jersey “citizens with greater
rights . . . than those available under the United States Constitution.” Lewis v. Harris,
908 A.2d 196, 220 (N.J. 2006). Whether the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act would
survive state equal protection scrutiny is beyond the scope of this Comment.
144
Grzyboski, supra note 70, at 1G.
145
See id.
146
N.J. CONST., art. IV, § 7, ¶ 7.
147
Because private, special, and local have been interpreted as synonymous in the
context of these constitutional provisions, this Comment will hereinafter refer to
such laws simply as “special.”
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tution includes a process by which the legislature may pass such legis148
lation.
149
In Vreeland v. Byrne, the Supreme Court of New Jersey described why many states have implemented general prohibitions of
special laws:
The legislative and judicial processes [have] developed along different lines . . . the legislative process lacks the safeguards of due
process and the tradition of impartiality which restrain the courts
from using their powers to dispense special favors. Over the
course of time, as a result, the propensities of legislatures to indulge in favoritism through special legislation developed into a
major abuse of governmental power.
As the bulk of special laws grew, demands for reform became
insistent, and constitutional prohibitions were enacted to limit the
practice of enacting special legislation and to achieve greater universality and uniformity in the operation of statute law in respect
150
to all persons.

Thus, as the Vreeland court described, special law prohibitions, both
in New Jersey and elsewhere, developed as a control on the tendency
of legislatures to engage in favoritism and partiality, a tendency that
would manifest itself in legislation passed for the benefit of particular
151
groups.
The New Jersey Constitution, except for the use of special as synonymous with private or local, does not define “special law,” nor does
152
it set any line between special and general laws. However, New Jersey courts have been relatively consistent in their definition and
153
analysis of special laws. In 1878, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
154
defined special laws as follows in State ex rel. Van Riper v. Parsons:
[S]pecial laws are all those that rest on a false or deficient classification; their vice is that they do not embrace all the class to which
they are naturally related; they create preference and establish
inequalities; they apply to persons, things or places possessed of
certain qualities or situations, and exclude from their effect other
148

N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 8. The New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act was not passed
pursuant to this process. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-55 to -64 (West 2006).
149
370 A.2d 825 (N.J. 1977).
150
Id. at 828 (quoting 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 40.01 (4th ed.
1973)).
151
Id.
152
See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶¶ 7, 8.
153
New Jersey first precluded special laws governing certain subjects in 1875, and
this prohibition passed with little change into the new state constitution in 1947.
Vreeland, 370 A.2d at 828.
154
40 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1878).
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persons, things or places which are not dissimilar in these re155
spects.

While the definition and analysis have been formulated differently over the years, the substance of the State ex rel. Van Riper formu156
lation remains essentially intact in New Jersey special law analysis.
157
State ex rel. Budd v. Hancock further developed the State ex rel. Van
Riper rule and sharpened the focus of the analysis on those parties
excluded by a legislative classification, finding a law to be special
when “by force of an inherent limitation, it arbitrarily separates some
persons, places or things from others upon which, but for such limitation, it would operate. The test of a special law is the appropriate158
ness of its provisions to the objects that it excludes.”
More recent formulations of the special law analysis have mirrored these prior cases. The most oft-cited case on New Jersey special
law refers to both State ex rel. Van Riper and State ex rel. Budd in stating:
In deciding whether an act is general or special, it is what is excluded that is the determining factor and not what is included. If
no one is excluded who should be encompassed, the law is general. Another requirement of a general law is that it must affect
equally all of a group who, bearing in mind the purposes of the
legislation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked
159
and important to make them a class by themselves.
160

Vreeland v. Byrne likewise translated the early formulations into
a method of special law analysis, with the first step being to “discern
the purpose and object of the enactment,” the second being “to apply
it to the factual situation presented,” before finally deciding
“whether, as so applied, the resulting classification can be said to rest
upon any rational or reasonable basis relevant to the purpose and ob161
ject of the act.”
Comparisons between special law analysis and federal equal protection analysis naturally arise because both are concerned with clas-

155

Id. at 9.
See Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36, 44–45 (N.J.
1981) (listing several formulations of the special law analysis, one of which cited State
ex rel. Van Riper as support for its formulation).
157
48 A. 1023 (N.J. 1901).
158
Id. at 1024.
159
Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 153 A.2d 10, 14 (N.J. 1959) (citations
omitted).
160
370 A.2d 825 (N.J. 1977).
161
Id. at 829. See also Mahwah v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation, 486 A.2d 818,
826 (N.J. 1985) (applying Vreeland three-part test); Newark Superior Officers Ass’n v.
Newark, 486 A.2d 305, 311–12 (N.J. 1985) (same).
156
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sifications before the law. In fact, several New Jersey special law cases
have equated the special law standard to an equal protection rational
relationship standard, which legislation satisfies if it “bears a rational
162
163
For instance, in Robson v.
relation to some legitimate end.”
164
Rodriquez, the Supreme Court of New Jersey expressly declared that
“[t]he test of whether a law constitutes special legislation is essentially
the same as that which determines whether it affords equal protec165
Likewise, while Paul Kimball Hospital, Inc. v. Brick
tion of the laws.”
166
Township Hospital, Inc. toned down the language of Robson in referring to the tests as “similar” rather than “essentially the same,” the
opinion shortly thereafter employed principles common to the equal
protection analysis, including that “an adequate factual basis for the
legislative judgment [to create a particular classification] is presumed
to exist” and that such legislative distinctions are strongly presumed
167
to be constitutional.
However, several of the aforementioned formulations of the
special law analysis suggest a critical distinction from an equal protection rational relationship analysis. For instance, in Vreeland, the Supreme Court of New Jersey required as the first step in the special law
analysis that “the purpose and object of the enactment,” rather than
any conceivable purpose, be discerned to determine if the classification in question rested upon a rational relationship to that purpose
168
and object. Even Paul Kimball Hospital, notwithstanding its allusion
to the similarity of the equal protection and special law analyses and
use of principles traditionally employed as part of the equal protection analysis, found the legislative classification at issue valid because

162

As aforementioned, the legitimate end need not be the actual or primary purpose of the legislation, but rather any conceivable purpose. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
163
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
164
141 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1958).
165
Id. at 6.
166
432 A.2d 36 (N.J. 1981).
167
Id. at 45; see also Phillips v. Curiale, 608 A.2d 895, 905 (N.J. 1992) (quoting
Robson and reasoning that plaintiff’s assertion that the statute in question denied him
Equal Protection constituted a special law challenge); Mahwah v. Bergen County Bd.
of Taxation, 486 A.2d 818, 827 (N.J. 1985) (quoting Robson and holding that, as in an
equal protection rational relationship analysis, legislation containing a classification
will be held valid if any conceivable basis justifies the classification); Harvey v. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 153 A.2d 10, 15 (N.J. 1959) (stating that a legislative classification is “presumed to rest upon a rational basis” in a special law analysis if any conceivable set of facts supports the classification).
168
Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 829 (N.J. 1977).
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it bore a rational relationship to “the purpose and object of the [leg169
islation],” rather than merely any conceivable purpose.
Admittedly, the difference between an analysis requiring a classification to bear a rational relationship to any conceivable purpose, a
hallmark of the traditional rational relationship test, and one requiring a rational relationship to the stated, primary, or apparent pur170
pose of a statute is a subtle one.
If the outcomes of New Jersey Supreme Court special law cases uniformly signaled that the traditional
rational relationship test was being applied to determine the validity
of a particular classification, then the subtle departures described in
the previous paragraph from the equal protection model could easily
be dismissed as insignificant linguistic imprecision, not reflective of
171
However, the Suthe overarching holdings of the particular cases.
preme Court of New Jersey has found classifications that would seem
to meet a traditional rational relationship standard as invalid special
172
laws, inviting the suggestion that the special law standard is more
173
demanding. As will be discussed, the clarification of this grey area
of New Jersey special law jurisprudence—whether a classification
need be related to an actual purpose of a statute, or merely any conceivable purpose—is a critical one, as the determination will likely
prove dispositive in the special law analysis of the New Jersey Smoke174
Free Air Act.
B. Representative Cases
A look at several New Jersey special law cases demonstrates both
the lack of uniformity with which the court has applied the purpose
175
aspect of the special law analysis and the consequences of one formulation as opposed to the other. In Harvey v. Board of Chosen Free176
holders, for example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey not only de169

Paul Kimball Hospital, Inc., 432 A.2d at 46.
See supra notes 156–69 and accompanying text.
171
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 207 n.3 (1992) (White, J., dissenting) (finding quotations from older cases alluded to by the majority to be mere
“window dressing” in light of the many recent cases on the disputed issue that made
no reference to the subject of these selective quotations).
172
See, e.g., Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288
(N.J. 1993) (see infra notes 197–210 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion of this case); Vreeland, 370 A.2d 825.
173
See infra notes 238–85 and accompanying text.
174
Id.
175
Purpose aspect is the term this Comment will use to refer to whether the classification need bear a rational relationship to any conceivable purpose, or to the actual
or apparent purpose.
176
153 A.2d 10 (N.J. 1959).
170
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scribed the special law analysis in a manner nearly identical to a traditional rational relationship analysis, but clearly considered any con177
In Harvey, a
ceivable purpose for the allegedly special legislation.
supplement to a state pension statute provided that county freeholders could require any court attendant in the office of the sheriff who
had served over twenty years and who was over sixty-five years of age
to retire, provided that the attendant was a member of the state em178
ployee retirement system. A court attendant forced to retire under
the statute claimed that the exemption of employees not in the state
179
retirement system rendered the statute an invalid special law.
180
As previously discussed, the oft-cited formulation of the special
law analysis in Harvey focused on what is excluded from the purview
of the legislation by the classification, and whether the law affects
“equally all of a group who, bearing in mind the purposes of the legislation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and
181
important to make them a class by themselves.”
The opinion later
clarified that the “purposes of the legislation” contemplated in the
analysis are not limited to the legislature’s stated or actual purposes,
but rather “any conceivable state of facts which would afford reason182
Applying such a standard, the
able support” for the classification.
court held the classification to be valid, finding it conceivable, although not stated on the record, that “the legislature decided to exclude from retirement those over 65 and not members of the retirement system because the non-members would have no pension upon
183
which to rely.”
This classification, according to the court, was thus
reasonably based on a balancing between the “financial ability to care
for oneself and a policy judgment as to the desirability of limiting
184
those over 65 in this type of hazardous work.”
185
Vreeland v. Byrne, decided eighteen years later in a four-to-three
decision, seemed to stray from the strict parallel between special law
and equal protection analysis presented by Harvey. The challenged
statute in Vreeland increased the salary of associate justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey but denied that increase to any present
member of the state senate or general assembly that was thereafter
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id. at 15.
Id. at 13.
Id.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
Harvey, 153 A.2d at 14 (citations omitted).
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
370 A.2d 825 (N.J. 1977).
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186

appointed to the bench. When the governor nominated a member
of the state senate to the court and the state senate confirmed the
187
nomination, the validity of the statute took center stage.
The Vreeland court applied a three-step approach to the special
law analysis, determining first “the purpose and object of the enactment,” then applying this determination to the facts presented, and
finally deciding “whether as so applied, the resulting classification can
be said to rest upon any rational or reasonable basis relevant to the
188
purpose and object of the act.” The court determined the purpose
189
of the statute to be solely to adjust judicial salaries. Under the facts
of the case, the statute would result in one justice, distinguished from
the other justices only in that he had been a state senator at the time
of the statute’s passage, receiving a lower salary than the other jus190
This classification, the court concluded, did not rest upon a
tices.
rational basis relevant to the aforementioned purpose, thus render191
ing the questioned statute unconstitutionally special.
The dissent in Vreeland, apparently recognizing the divergence of
the majority’s application of the special law analysis from prior analyses more closely adhering to the traditional rational relationship
model, identified a clearly “conceivable state of facts which would
192
suggest a rational reason for the statutory exemption.”
Conceivably, the dissent argued, the legislators that included the exception
may well have wished to avoid the personal bias that the statute could
have invoked if the judicial salary increases were made applicable to

186

Id. at 827.
Id. at 826–27. The special law provision at issue was not the broad prohibition
of special laws absent a particular manner of public notification, but rather the absolute prohibition of special laws increasing or decreasing the term or tenure rights of
public employees. Id. at 827. Additionally, the case was far more complicated than
the typical special law challenge. See id. at 826–27. A group of taxpayer groups and
state senators challenged the nomination, stating that it contravened a provision of
the New Jersey Constitution that prohibited members of the state senate from being
nominated during their term for any state civil office or position. Id. at 827. Both
sides conceded that, were the state statute containing the judicial salary increase
found to be unconstitutional as special legislation, the appointment would violate
the state constitution in the manner argued by the plaintiffs. Id, at 827. Thus, while
the judicial nominee would seem to be the party adversely affected by allegedly special legislation denying him a salary increase, he was among the parties defending
the state statute as general legislation, as a contrary finding would render his nomination void. Id.
188
Id. at 829.
189
Id. at 828.
190
Id. at 829.
191
Vreeland, 370 A.2d at 829.
192
Id. at 850 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
187
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193

legislators that later took the bench.
The classification barring
those that voted on the salary increase from taking part in the increase would clearly have borne a rational relationship to this conceivable purpose, the dissent contended, as the classification eliminated the possibility that personal bias directed the legislators’
194
votes. Thus, the dissent concluded, the law did not violate the pro195
hibition of special laws.
Nonetheless, the majority rejected the argument concerning this conceivable purpose, instead focusing on the
stated purpose of mere adjustment to judicial salaries and concluding
196
that the distinction bore no rational relationship to this purpose.
The apparent split of the court in this case, on whether the classification need bear some rational relationship to the actual purpose of
the legislation or merely to any conceivable purpose, accurately
represents the divergent paths special law cases have taken at times in
New Jersey.
The most recent New Jersey special law case also saw the Supreme Court of New Jersey split on its functional, if not nominal, adherence to a traditional rational relationship analysis in determining
197
In Town of Sethe reasonableness of the challenged classification.
caucus v. Hudson County Board of Taxation, the court considered a state
law that exempted cities operating vocational programs for over
twenty years in counties of certain population sizes and densities from
198
Although the
payment of taxes toward county vocational schools.
statute did not state so expressly, it effectively applied only to
199
Bayonne, allowing the city to pay a lower county tax rate due to its
200
satisfaction of these requirements.
The majority in Town of Secaucus, citing several special law cases
including Vreeland, recited a special law analysis formula in line with a
201
traditional equal protection rational relationship analysis. Quoting
202
Budd, the court declared that a law is special “when, by force of an
193

Id.
Id. at 850.
195
Id. at 851.
196
Id. at 829 (majority opinion).
197
Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288 (N.J.
1993). As in Vreeland, the special law provision at issue was an absolute prohibition,
this one being the prohibition of special laws “[r]elating to taxation or exemption
therefrom.” Id. at 294 (quoting N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 9(6)).
198
Id. at 291.
199
A law is not necessarily special because it applies only to a class of one. Paul
Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36, 46 (N.J. 1981).
200
Town of Secaucus, 628 A.2d at 290.
201
See id. at 294.
202
State ex rel. Budd v. Hancock, 48 A. 1023, 1024 (N.J. 1901).
194
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inherent limitation, it arbitrarily separates some persons, places or
things from others upon which, but for such limitation, it would op203
In determining whether the separation was arbitrary, the
erate.”
court stated that it need not limit its inquiry “to the stated purpose of
the legislation, but should seek any conceivable rational basis” upon
204
The court then discerned two
which the classification may rest.
conceivable legitimate purposes to the legislation—avoiding double
taxation of municipalities with their own vocational schools and promoting quality vocational schools in densely populated areas—but
concluded its Vreeland analysis by holding that the exception of
Bayonne bore no rational relationship to either of these two objec205
tives.
As in Vreeland, the Town of Secaucus dissent argued that the majority failed to consider adequately any conceivable purpose in its ap206
plication of the special law analysis.
The lines drawn by the exception, the dissent contended, represented a reasonable attempt to
relieve residents of municipalities of a certain population size and
density with established vocational programs of the obligation of paying for a county vocational program of which those residents would
207
That the court did not find the
be unlikely to avail themselves.
boundaries of the classification reasonable was immaterial, the dissent continued, as “courts should not substitute their judgment for
that of the Legislature in determining whether a legislative classifica208
tion is rational.”
In fact, the dissent emphasized, the majority expressly recognized at least a remote, and thus conceivable, possibility
that the statute and exception related to the legislative purpose of
promoting vocational programs in the most densely populated mu209
Because the conceivable purposes acknowledged by
nicipalities.
the majority formed a plausible basis for the contested exception, the
dissent concluded, the majority erred in striking down the statute as
210
an unconstitutional special law.
One additional New Jersey trial court special law case warrants
discussion in relation to the New Jersey indoor smoking prohibition,
as the case concerns a statute that applies only to Atlantic City. In

203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Town of Secaucus, 628 A.2d at 294.
Id. at 294–95.
Id. at 294–96.
Id. at 305 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Id. at 303.
Id. at 305.
Town of Secaucus, 628 A.2d at 305 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Parking Authority of Atlantic City v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the
plaintiff parking authority attacked as unconstitutional a state law
that provided that:
the “governing body of any county in which is located a municipality in which casino gaming is authorized” may adopt an ordinance or resolution creating a county transportation authority . . .
. [The] county transportation authority shall have preemptive jurisdiction with respect to public transportation matters and shall
be the exclusive instrumentality with responsibility for those ser212
vices.

In effect, this statute allowed for the dissolution of the existing mu213
nicipal parking authority in Atlantic City, the plaintiff, and estab214
lished a new county public agency to carry out the same function.
Plaintiff parking authority asserted that the problems the legislature
intended to solve with this statute, problems related to transportation, were not unique to Atlantic City, thus making the separate classification of Atlantic City for purposes of this statute arbitrary and in
215
violation of the New Jersey Constitution.
Atlantic City’s unique New Jersey constitutional status injected
the special law analysis in Parking Authority of Atlantic City with a novel
issue—the “determination as to when it is appropriate to specifically
classify Atlantic County as a unique area, based upon collateral prob216
lems which may arise as the result of casino gaming.”
The court
observed that the statute did not address a concern that is “inherently
related” to gambling; rather, the legislation took aim at a problem
“only derivatively the result of the implementation of casino gaming
217
in Atlantic City.” While the separate constitutional treatment of Atlantic City in terms of gambling may serve as a tempting ground to
justify other classifications, the court ruled that “the mere authorization of casino gaming in Atlantic City does not in and of itself justify
the legislative classification contained in the County Transportation
218
Authorities Act.”
In other words, laws classifying Atlantic City for
separate treatment do not survive special law analysis for the mere

211

434 A.2d 676 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981).
Id. at 679 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:35B-4, 6(a) (West 2006)).
213
“Absent an organic change in the New Jersey Constitution, it is impossible for
any other county to avail itself of the authority provided by the act.” Id. at 681.
214
Id. at 680.
215
Id. at 681–82.
216
Id. at 681.
217
Parking Auth. of Atlantic City, 434 A.2d at 682.
218
Id.
212
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fact that Atlantic City is so classified in terms of gambling under the
219
New Jersey Constitution.
However, the court did not find Atlantic City’s unique constitu220
tional status immaterial to the special law determination. Rather, it
held that where the legislature directs a statute at a collateral problem resulting from the municipality’s allowance of gambling, the
statute’s separate treatment of Atlantic City is reasonable “if a direct
nexus can be established between the advent of casino gaming and
221
the collateral problem created thereby.”
As far as the statute at issue was concerned, the court found a sufficient nexus between the
allowance of gambling in Atlantic City and the transportation problems posed by the resulting steady stream of visitors to justify separate
222
classification of Atlantic City under the statute.
No search for a conceivable purpose of the statutory classification in Parking Authority of Atlantic City was necessary, as the court
found the classification contained in the statute to be reasonably related to the stated purpose of the legislation, to relieve Atlantic City
223
of its unique transportation problems.
The opinion did recite the
Harvey formulation of the special law analysis and noted, as virtually
all special law cases do, the strong presumption of constitutionality
for legislative classifications and the wide range of discretion the leg224
However, the
islature is afforded in making such classifications.
decision offered little overall insight regarding the purpose aspect of
the special law analysis; the case’s value in terms of this Comment
centers squarely on the court’s observations concerning the effect
that Atlantic City’s unique constitutional treatment plays in a special
225
law analysis.
C. Current Special Law Analysis
On one hand, the language of New Jersey special law analysis has
remained relatively constant over the years. When the Paul Kimball
Hospital opinion quoted Van Riper in characterizing special laws as
those that “create preference and establish inequalities[,] . . . apply to
persons, things or places possessed of certain qualities or situations,
and exclude from their effect other persons, things or places which
219
220
221
222
223
224
225

Id.
Id. at 684.
Id.
Id.
Parking Auth. of Atlantic City, 434 A.2d at 684.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 680–85.
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226

are not dissimilar in these respects,” it cited a case over 100 years its
elder. Similarly, Town of Secaucus recited a ninety-year-old special law
227
analysis formulation when it drew language from Budd. One might
expect such continuity to create certainty as to the analysis employed
in special law cases.
On the other hand, the analysis in relatively recent special law
cases has seemed to vary, if not in form, then in substance, as to the
purpose aspect of the analysis. This aspect is critical, as every formulation of the analysis requires some determination of whether the
disputed classification is reasonable in terms of a legislative pur228
pose.
The most recent special law case, Town of Secaucus, used the
three-step special law analytical formula from Vreeland and at least recited that a court is not limited to the stated purpose of legislation
but may consider any conceivable legitimate purpose in determining
229
whether a classification is appropriate.
As was the case in Vree230
land, however, the majority in Town of Secaucus seemed to be far
more critical of the legitimacy of conceivable purposes to the challenged legislation than the court had been in earlier special law cases,
which applied a standard nearly identical to the highly deferential
231
Each of these cases
equal protection rational relationship model.
appeared to require that something more than a conceivable legiti232
mate purpose serve as the basis for the challenged classification.
The passage of nearly fifteen years since Town of Secaucus without another New Jersey Supreme Court special law decision has only further
obscured any conception of how courts are to apply the purpose aspect of the special law analysis.

226

Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36, 44 (N.J. 1981)
(quoting State ex rel. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.L. 1, 9 (N.J. 1878)).
227
Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288, 294 (N.J.
1993) (quoting State ex rel. Budd v. Hancock, 48 A. 1023, 1024 (N.J. 1901)).
228
See Roe v. Kervick, 199 A.2d 834, 858 (N.J. 1964) (defining a law as general if it,
among other things, “encompasses all of the subjects which reasonably belong within
the classification”); Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 153 A.2d 10, 14 (N.J. 1959)
(“Another requirement of a general law is that it must affect equally all of a group
who, bearing in mind the purposes of the legislation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves.”); State
ex rel. Budd, 48 A. at 1024 (asking whether the classification “arbitrarily separates
some persons” and considering the “appropriateness” of a statute’s provisions to
those the statute excludes).
229
Town of Secaucus, 628 A.2d at 294.
230
Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 850 (N.J. 1977) (Pashman, J., dissenting).
231
Town of Secaucus, 628 A.2d. at 305 (Stein, J., dissenting).
232
Vreeland, 370 A.2d at 850 (Pashman, J. dissenting); Town of Secaucus, 628 A.2d
at 305 (Stein, J., dissenting).
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In the special law analysis of the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act,
the observations from Parking Authority of Atlantic City, while not carrying the weight of law, shed some light on the special law conse233
quences of Atlantic City’s unique constitutional status.
The mere
fact that the New Jersey Constitution affords Atlantic City separate
treatment in regard to gambling does not justify, by itself, separate
234
treatment in other regards. In fact, even a law expressly aimed at a
problem collateral to the allowance of gambling in Atlantic City re235
A law
quires a direct nexus between gambling and the problem.
classifying Atlantic City for separate treatment must at least have a
conceivable, legitimate purpose to which the classification is ration236
ally related, and may require such a relationship to the law’s actual
237
purpose.
IV. SPECIAL LAW ANALYSIS OF THE NEW JERSEY SMOKE-FREE AIR ACT
A. General Application
Since the Supreme Court of New Jersey has viewed the special
238
law analysis as essentially unchanged over the past 100 years, the
court could apply any one of the several formulations of the analysis
described herein to determine whether the New Jersey Smoke-Free
Air Act, with its exception of casinos, constitutes a special law. The
239
issue, in the language of the oldest New Jersey special law case, is
whether the indoor smoking ban embraces all members of the class—
indoor public areas—that it is naturally related to, and whether the
ban creates a preference for casinos and establishes inequalities for
240
other indoor areas.
Using the Harvey formulation, the class that is excluded—
241
If casinos
casinos—would be the crucial factor in the analysis.
should not be encompassed by the law, then the law is not rendered

233

Parking Auth. of Atlantic City v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 434 A.2d 676, 682–
84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981).
234
Id. at 682.
235
Id. at 684.
236
Id. at 680–84.
237
See supra notes 168–74 and accompanying text.
238
See Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36, 44 (N.J.
1981) (listing several formulations of the analysis, starting with the Budd formulation
from 1901, as in agreement with one another).
239
State ex rel. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1878).
240
See id. at 9.
241
See Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 153 A.2d 10, 15 (N.J. 1959).
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242

special by virtue of the exclusion.
Another Harvey requirement for
the ban to be considered a general law is that the indoor areas to
which it is applied, bearing in mind the purpose of the legislation,
must be distinguished from casinos by characteristics sufficiently
243
marked and important to make them a class by themselves.
Under the Vreeland formula, most recently used in Town of Secau244
cus, the Supreme Court of New Jersey would first need to discern
245
the purpose and object of the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act. Then
the court would have to decide whether the facts presented—the allowance of smoking in an indoor public area, casino floors, while
smoking is disallowed in all other indoor public areas—demonstrate
a rational basis relevant to the purpose and object of the act for the
246
exception of casinos from the otherwise broad legislation.
These restatements of the special law analysis in the context of
the New Jersey smoking ban shed little light on the likely outcome of
such an analysis. Rather, the outcome depends on whether the court
requires the classification to bear a reasonable relationship to the actual or primary purpose of the legislation, or merely to bear such a
247
relationship to any conceivable purpose.
Under either test, it is
important to note that the mere fact that Atlantic City is distinguished by the New Jersey Constitution for separate treatment in the
context of gambling likely does not render other separate treatment
248
constitutionally permissible per se.
On the other hand, the mere
fact that the law applies only to one municipality does not render it
249
unconstitutionally special per se.
B. Any Conceivable Purpose Analysis
If the Supreme Court of New Jersey interprets the purpose aspect of the special law analysis to allow for any conceivable purpose,
then the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act will almost certainly be upheld as constitutionally valid. The stated and primary purpose of the
242

See id.
See id.
244
Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288, 294 (N.J.
1993).
245
See Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 829 (N.J. 1977).
246
See id.
247
See supra notes 175–210 and accompanying text (discussing cases such as Harvey, Vreeland, and Town of Secaucus that seem to employ the purpose aspect of the
analysis in various manners).
248
Parking Auth. of Atlantic City v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 434 A.2d 676, 682
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981).
249
Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36, 46 (N.J. 1981).
243
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ban is to promote the public interest by protecting the “nonsmoking
majority of the public” from the hazard of secondhand smoke in in250
An argument that the excepdoor public places and workplaces.
tion of certain indoor areas is rationally related to this public health
end, if possible, would clearly be strained. However, under this traditional rational relationship analysis, the exception does not become
invalid for failure to bear a rational relationship to the stated purpose
251
of the legislation.
One could certainly conceive that the purpose of the casino exception to the Smoke-Free Air Act is to protect the economic interest
of Atlantic City, a major New Jersey tourist attraction, against compet252
ing tourist areas that allow smoking in casinos.
The New Jersey
Legislature expressly recognized the value of a thriving Atlantic City
to the “general welfare, health and prosperity of the State” when it
decided to use gambling as “a unique tool of urban redevelopment”
253
Furthermore, at least one study, albeit one that was
for the city.
sponsored by the New Jersey Casino Association and criticized by opponents of the casino exemption, concluded that a smoking ban in
casinos would cause gamblers to choose other tourist destinations,
costing the state millions in tourism revenue and costing thousands
254
of casino employees their jobs.
Recognition that a smoking ban in
casinos could undercut efforts to maintain Atlantic City’s prominence
255
as a tourist attraction may have been balanced by the legislature
against the public interest in protecting the nonsmoking majority
256
from secondhand smoke in enacting the Smoke-Free Air Act with
the exception.
Finding a conceivable purpose for the exception of casinos to be
257
the protection of tourism in Atlantic City, the various formulations
250

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-56 (West 2006).
See Mahwah v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation, 486 A.2d 818, 827 (N.J. 1985)
(“[T]he court is not limited to the stated purpose of the legislation, but should seek
any conceivable rational basis.”).
252
See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
253
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1(b). The statute also states that “the restoration of Atlantic City as the Playground of the World and the major hospitality center of the
Eastern United States is found to be a program of critical concern and importance to
the inhabitants of the State of New Jersey.” Id.
254
Gurney, Odds Against A.C., supra note 83, at B01.
255
See Holl, supra note 73, at 6 (explaining casino operators fear that such a ban
would result in gambler tourists deciding to go to Las Vegas or Native American-run
casinos rather than Atlantic City).
256
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-56.
257
A broader statutory purpose may exist in balancing the protection of public
health with the economic interests of Atlantic City and other exempted areas.
251
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of the special law analysis clearly favor the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air
Act being upheld. Under the State ex rel. Van Riper test, the statute
258
However, the class that
may still create a preference for casinos.
the ban was meant for would not naturally embrace casinos, as the
purpose of protecting the economic interest of Atlantic City would
259
place a natural limit on the otherwise broad class.
Likewise, in the language of Harvey, the conceivable economic
interest purpose could dictate that casinos should not be encom260
passed by the law.
Bearing this purpose in mind, the indoor areas
to which the ban is applied, or conversely, the indoor areas to which
the exception is applied, would be “distinguished by characteristics
sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by them261
The characteristic distinguishing casinos from essentially
selves.”
262
all other indoor public areas, the importance of casinos to the eco263
nomic interest of Atlantic City, obviously bears a direct relation to
the purpose of economic protection. Thus, interpreting the purpose
aspect of the Harvey test to allow for any conceivable purpose clearly
results in a finding that the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act withstands
a special law attack.
Finally, the Vreeland analysis yields the same result. Allowing for
any conceivable purpose, the court could discern the purpose, or at
least a purpose, of the statute to be the protection of Atlantic City’s
264
tourist industry. The facts presented—the allowance of smoking in
an indoor public area, casino floors, while smoking is disallowed in all
other indoor public areas—would then represent a perfectly rational
result in terms of this purpose, reflecting the legislative decision that
Atlantic City’s casino floors must be exempted from the indoor smoking ban in order to achieve the purpose of economic protection.
The federal court decision in Coalition for Equal Rights, Inc. v.
265
Owens foreshadows this predicted outcome of a New Jersey special
law challenge should the Supreme Court of New Jersey employ a traditional rational relationship approach. In Owens, the court found
the economic protection of Colorado’s casinos against less regulated
258

See State ex rel. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.L. 1, 9 (N.J. 1878).
See id.
260
See Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 153 A.2d 10, 15 (N.J. 1959).
261
Id. at 14.
262
See supra note 69 (listing the other classes of establishments that are exempt
from the ban).
263
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1(b) (West 2006) (describing casinos as a “unique
tool of urban redevelopment” for Atlantic City).
264
See Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 829 (N.J. 1977).
265
No. 06-CV-01145, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42723 (D. Colo. June 23, 2006).
259
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Native American competitors to be a conceivable purpose to which
Colorado’s exception of casinos from its indoor smoking ban was ra266
Were the Supreme Court of New Jersey to apply
tionally related.
the traditional rational relationship test to the virtually identical New
Jersey statute and exception, and in consideration of a virtually identical statutory purpose, the court would almost certainly come to an
267
identical conclusion—the validity of the statute.
C. Actual or Stated Purpose Analysis
If the New Jersey Supreme Court interprets the purpose aspect
of the special law analysis to require a rational relationship to the actual or stated purpose of a statute, then the New Jersey Smoke-Free
Air Act faces a far more significant obstacle in a special law challenge.
While the protection of the state’s economic interest in a thriving Atlantic City is certainly a plausible purpose for the statute’s exception
of casinos, the statute recites no such purpose or findings that would
268
269
support such a purpose.
In fact, the scant information available
on the legislators’ intent in including the exception suggests that the
exception developed not as an economic consideration, but as a conciliatory gesture to “the powerful casino industry and its allies in the
legislature’s South Jersey delegation” in order to ensure passage of
270
the bill.
Admittedly, the casino lobby’s intent in opposing the bill was
271
likely purely economic.
One might argue that this economic, policy-based concern was transferred to the legislature in the legislature’s adoption of the casino exception. However, no part of the legislative history indicates that the legislature made any determination
266

Id. at *17.
See supra notes 251–65 and accompanying text.
268
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-56 (reciting the legislative findings relevant to the
smoking ban).
269
See supra note 84 (explaining that the legislative history on the Smoke-Free Air
Act contains no hearing transcripts, debate transcripts, or witness testimony, and is
essentially limited to restatements of the bill’s language).
270
Holl, supra note 73, at 6; see also Gurney, Odds Against A.C., supra note 83, at
B01 (describing the “public-health advocates” of the smoking ban in the legislature
as accepting the casino exemption as a political necessity in the face of casino lobby
opposition despite the secondhand smoke hazards that casino employees face, and
quoting the chairman of the senate’s health committee describing the exemption as
undesirable but necessary to secure the needed votes); Ung, supra note 82, at B01
(describing an assemblywoman who sponsored the bill as regretting that the exemption of casinos was necessary to secure the bill’s passage).
271
See Gurney, Odds Against A.C., supra note 83, at B01 (describing the economic
analysis that served as the foundation for the “formidable offensive” that the New Jersey Casino Association mounted against the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act).
267
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on the potential economic harm to the casinos from the smoking ban
272
or that such potential harm outweighed the recognized benefits to
273
public health that the smoking ban created. Rather, the statements
of legislators that supported the bill indicate simply that, considering
the sway of the casino lobbying group in the state legislature, the ex274
emption was a political necessity. Since the mere appeasement of a
powerful lobbying group is not a legitimate government purpose for
legislation or an exemption thereto, and is in fact the very evil the
275
New Jersey special law prohibition was meant to prevent, the apparent or actual purpose of the New Jersey indoor smoking ban
seems limited to the stated purpose, that being the protection of the
276
nonsmoking majority’s health.
Limiting the special law analysis to this actual and stated purpose, rather than considering any conceivable purpose, tilts the
analysis toward a finding that the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act constitutes unconstitutional special legislation. In the terms of State ex rel.
Van Riper, the statute seemingly fails to embrace a class—casinos—to
which the statute is naturally related, as casinos possess no quality
relevant to the public health purpose of the statute that distinguishes
277
Thus, the statute seems to “create
them from other indoor areas.
preference and establish inequalities,” rendering it an unconstitu278
tional special law.
The Harvey test similarly favors a finding of the New Jersey smoking ban’s unconstitutionality when limited to the stated and apparent
purpose of the statute. Focusing, as Harvey requires, on the class ex272

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-56.
See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
274
Id.
275
Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 828 (N.J. 1977) (quoting 2 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 40.01 (4th ed. 1973)) (explaining that the very evils special law prohibitions developed to combat were the “propensities of legislatures to
indulge in favoritism”); see also Gurney, Group Sues, supra note 88, at B01 (quoting
Rutgers University School of Law Professor Robert Williams that “[i]n a political
sense, th[e] distinction was completely rational, because it wasn’t going to pass otherwise. But that’s not the way it would be interpreted in a court of law.”).
276
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-56. Even Senator Adler’s rather tepid defense of the
exemption, that “[t]he state is allowed to draw rational distinctions about what it
regulates and why it regulates it,” was made in reference to an equal protection challenge to the legislation, not a special law challenge. Gurney, Group Sues, supra note
88, at B01. As previously discussed, this defense may not be relevant to a special law
analysis, as such an analysis may require the distinction to be rationally related to the
stated or actual purpose of the legislation, rather than merely any conceivable purpose. See supra notes 168–69, 184–210 and accompanying text.
277
State ex rel. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.L. 1, 9 (N.J. 1878).
278
Id.
273
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279

cluded from the legislation, it seems evident that the public health
purpose offers no basis for casinos falling outside the legislation’s
scope. In other words, no “sufficiently marked and important” characteristics, “bearing in mind the [public health] purpose[] of the legislation,” distinguish casinos from other indoor areas covered by the
280
ban.
Confining the Vreeland formula to the stated or actual purpose of
281
a statute would also very likely result in a finding that the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act violates the New Jersey Constitution as a special law. Such a limitation would dictate that the “purpose and object
of the enactment,” to be determined as the first step of the Vreeland
282
283
analysis, is the protection of the nonsmoking majority’s health.
This purpose offers no rational or reasonable basis for the exception
that the factual situation presents, that being the exception of casinos
284
from a smoking ban encompassing virtually all other indoor areas.
As the dissents in both Vreeland and Town of Secaucus implied, a limitation of the special law analysis to exclude conceivable but unstated or
unintended purposes to the challenged legislation dramatically increases the likelihood that the challenged legislation will be struck
285
down as special.
One state court has in fact evaluated a smoking regulation
against a state constitutional prohibition of special laws. In City of
286
Tucson v. Grezaffi, an Arizona appellate court considered a smoking
287
regulation requiring that restaurants have separate smoking areas,
288
but not making the same requirement of bars and bowling alleys.
The court described the test of an allegedly special law as follows:
In order to withstand a challenge as special legislation, a law must
meet each of the following criteria: it must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective; any classification the
279

Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 153 A.2d 10, 15 (N.J. 1959).
Id.
281
The language of the test, requiring a determination of “the purpose and object
of the enactment,” and the application in that case would seem to suggest such a
construction. Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 829 (N.J. 1977).
282
Id.
283
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-56 (West 2006).
284
See Vreeland, 370 A.2d at 829.
285
See id. at 850 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s failure to
consider any conceivable purpose led to its holding that the challenged legislation
was special); Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288, 305
(N.J. 1993) (Stein, J. dissenting) (same).
286
23 P.3d 675 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
287
Id. at 679.
288
Id. at 682.
280
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law creates “must apply uniformly to all cases and to all members
within the circumstances provided for by the law”; and the law
“must be elastic, or open, not only to admit entry of additional
persons, places, or things attaining the requisite characteristics,
but also to enable others to exit the statute’s coverage when they
289
no longer have those characteristics.”

Using this test, the court found that the smoking regulation’s separate treatment of bars and bowling alleys did not constitute a special
290
law.
Even ignoring the differences between New Jersey’s smoking ban
and the far more limited city ordinance at issue in Grezaffi, a subtle
difference between the Arizona and New Jersey special law tests renders the Arizona appellate decision of little guidance to the New Jersey special law analysis of the Smoke-Free Air Act. Under the Arizona
test, the challenged law must bear some rational relationship to a le291
gitimate objective. However, the test states no requirement that the
disputed classification or exception have any rational relationship to
292
that or any objective.
Hence, because the smoking regulation in
Arizona was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of public
health, the court did not consider whether the exclusion of bars and
293
restaurants bore any relationship to that objective, or any objective.
New Jersey, on the other hand, requires that the “classification
can be said to rest upon any rational or reasonable basis relevant to
the purpose and object of the act” for the statute containing the clas294
sification to be held valid as a general law. Thus, unlike in Arizona,
both the statute and any classification therein must be found to bear
a rational relationship to at least some conceivable legitimate purpose
295
for the statute to withstand a special law challenge. Because of this
higher standard in New Jersey, at least compared to the Arizona special law analysis as applied in Grezaffi, the Arizona appellate court’s
decision is of little significance to the New Jersey special law analysis
289

Id. at 683 (quoting Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 800 P.2d 1251,
1257–58 (Ariz. 1990)).
290
Id. at 683–84.
291
Id. at 683.
292
See Grezaffi, 23 P.3d at 683. While the requirement that the classification “apply
uniformly to all cases and to all members within the circumstances provided for by
the law” may inject some consideration of the reasonableness of the classification,
the court in Grezaffi did not consider the factor in a manner parallel to the New Jersey requirement that the classification bear some rational relationship to the purpose
of the legislation. See id.
293
See id. at 683–84.
294
Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 829 (N.J. 1977).
295
Id.
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of its smoking ban. Rather, the question remains one likely to be determined by clarification of the purpose aspect of the special law
296
analysis by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
CONCLUSION
New Jersey’s special law cases simply do not paint a clear picture
of the analysis courts would apply to the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air
297
Act. Those cases that not only recite but also apply a traditional rational relationship analysis, considering any conceivable purpose as a
basis for a classification, clearly weigh in favor of a finding that the
298
Those
smoking ban is a constitutionally permissible general law.
that either recite that same standard but apply a more stringent one,
or simply require an actual or stated purpose to be considered as the
only possible basis for a classification, lean in the opposite direction—that the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act violates the New Jersey
299
Constitution as a special law.

296
297
298
299

See supra notes 248–86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 226–37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 250–67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 268–85 and accompanying text.

